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We examine the value market assigns to components of the cash flow to equity 
including potential dividends. We study non financial publicly traded firms 
from five Latin American countries. The model includes four variables: market 
value of equity, dividends paid, change in equity investment and change in 
liquid assets (potential dividends) and are regressed with actual equity value 
as dependent variable. Tests applied give robust results. The main conclusions: 
Market assigns less than one dollar to a future dollar for any of the variables 
studied. Potential dividends destroy value. A dollar invested in liquid assets 
has a negative Net Present Value and it is not zero NPV investments. We 
confirm the agency costs of keeping undistributed cash flows.
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Cash flow to equity, potential dividends, equity value.
JEL Classification: M41, G12, G31.
1 Este documento fue seleccionado en la convocatoria para enviar artículos, Call for Papers, realizada en el 
marco del Simposio “Análisis y propuestas creativas ante los retos del nuevo entorno empresarial”, organizado 
en celebración a los 30 años de la Facultad de Ciencias Administrativas y Económicas de la Universidad Icesi 
y de los 25 años de su revista académica, Estudios Gerenciales; el 15 y 16 de octubre de 2009, en la ciudad 
de Cali (Colombia). El documento fue presentado en las sesiones simultáneas del área de “Finanzas”.
* Autor para correspondencia.
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Dividendos potenciales y flujos de 
caja: un análisis regional para 
América Latina
Se examina el valor que el mercado 
asigna a los componentes del flujo 
de caja del accionista, incluidos los 
dividendos potenciales. Se estudia 
empresas transadas de cinco países 
de América Latina. El modelo incluye 
cuatro variables: valor de mercado del 
patrimonio, los dividendos pagados, 
cambio en la inversión de patrimonio 
y cambio en activos líquidos (dividen-
dos potenciales) y se regresaron con el 
valor de mercado del patrimonio como 
variable dependiente. Las pruebas 
estadísticas dan resultados sólidos. 
Conclusiones: El mercado asigna me-
nos de 1 dólar a un dólar futuro para 
cualquiera de las variables. Los divi-
dendos potenciales destruyen valor. 
Un dólar invertido en activos líquidos 
tiene un valor presente neto negativo. 
Confirmamos los costos de agencia de 
no distribuir los flujos de caja.
0!,!"2!3 #,!6%
Flujo de caja del accionista, dividen-
dos potenciales, valor del patrimo-
nio.
2%35-/ 
Potenciais dividendos e fluxo de 
caixa efetivos:  uma análise regio-
nal Latino Americana
Examinámos o valor que o mercado 
determina para componentes do fluxo 
de caixa, e para valoração do patrimó-
nio, incluindo potenciais dividendos. 
Estudámos firmas não financeiras de 
capital aberto de cinco países Latino 
Americanos. O modelo inclui as qua-
tro variáveis seguintes: valoração de 
patrimônio no mercado, dividendos 
pagos, mudança no investimento de 
patrimônio, e mudança em ativos 
disponíveis (potenciais dividendos). 
Foi realizada uma análise de regres-
são a essas variáveis usando valor de 
património real como uma variável 
dependente. Os testes efetuados 
produziram resultados fortes. As 
conclusões principais são as seguin-
tes: o mercado determina menos de 
um dólar para um futuro dólar por 
qualquer das variáveis em revista. 
Potenciais dividendos destruem o 
valor. Um dólar investido em ativos 
disponíveis tem um Valor Líquido 
Presente negativo e não é investi-
mento zero VPL. Nós confirmámos os 
custos da agência por manter fluxos 
de caixa retidos. 
0!,!62!3#(!6%
Fluxo de caixa para valoração, po-
tenciais dividendos, valoração de 
patrimônio.
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We have examined the value that 
the market assigns to different com-
ponents of the cash flow to equity 
including potential dividends. The 
theoretical and basic methodology 
of this work was developed by Vélez-
Pareja and Magni (2009).
Our study is about non financial 
publicly traded firms in five Latin 
American countries: Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru, dur-
ing the period 1991-2007. The model 
includes the following variables: 
market value of equity, dividends 
paid, change in equity investment 
and change in liquid assets (poten-
tial dividends). These variables are 
regressed with actual equity value 
(time t) as a dependent variable and 
the other variables as independent 
variables (including equity value) for 
a next period (time t+1). Tests applied 
have given solid results.
We are concerned with the value the 
market assigns to the components 
of the Cash Flow to Equity, CFE, 
in particular to the change in liquid 
assets. Common practice assumes it 
is distributed among shareholders 
although in reality or in the typical 
financial model used to derive the 
cash flows, it is not because it is listed 
in the balance sheet.
There are three main conclusions in 
this work: in first place, the market 
assigns less than one dollar today to 
a future dollar for any of the variables 
studied as expected. Secondly, in 
particular, we found that potential 
dividends (changes in liquid assets) 
destroy value. In other words, the val-
ue of a dollar today in liquid assets in 
t+1, is negative. Third, we have found 
that, contrary to common knowledge 
and assumptions, a dollar invested 
in liquid assets has a negative Net 
Present Value (NPV) and they are 
not zero NPV investments. These 
findings confirm the agency costs of 
the problem when undistributed cash 
flows are kept. It also confirms that 
liquid assets should not be included 
in the cash flows while being listed in 
the balance sheet as current practice 
does.
According to Damodaran (2008, p. 
106): “In the strictest sense, the 
only cash flow that an investor will 
receive from an equity investment 
in a publicly traded firm is the 
dividend that will be paid on the 
stock.” We adhere to this definition. 
Usually practice and textbooks con-
sider the working capital for cash 
flow calculation, excluding liquid 
assets. The net effect of this is the 
increase of the cash flows by a sum 
that is listed in the balance sheet; 
hence it is not effectively received 
by the shareholder. This amount is 
the increase in liquid assets. In sec-
tion one we show how this occurs. 
As a result, equity and firm value 
are overvalued. 
On the other hand, when we analyze 
the change in liquid assets, we find 
that it is part of the cash flow gener-
ated by the investment in liquid as-
sets; hence, when included in the cash 
flows, they are discounted to present 
value. This is part of the above over-
valued value. However, the same 
common practice assumes that liquid 
assets are zero NPV investments. For 
this reason, the actual book value of 
liquid assets is added to the present 
value of the cash flows. 
Empirical evidence suggests that we 
should abolish the practice of exclud-
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ing from the working capital the liq-
uid assets and adding the book value 
of liquid assets under the assumption 
that they are zero NPV investments. 
The only relevant cash flow is what 
effectively an investor receives from 
the equity investment: dividends and 
stock repurchases.
The article is organized as follows: 
in section one we define the problem 
and present a review of the current 
literature. In section two we describe 
in detail the theoretical model and 
propose the hypotheses. In section 
three we describe the data analyzed. 
In section four we analyze the data 
using ordinary linear regression 
OLS. In Section Five we present our 
conclusions.
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In this Section we define the problem 
and present a literature review. What 
we find as a problem is an overvalu-
ation of firm and equity value.
1.1. The problem 
It is a well spread practice among 
authors, teachers and practitioners 
to include undistributed dividends 
as part of the Cash Flow to Equity 
(CFE) (and hence in the Free Cash 
Flow, FCF). 
This happens when in the process of 
calculating working capital only non 
cash items are included. Working 
Capital (WC), is defined as the differ-
ence between current assets (cash (C) 
+ short-term investments (STI) + ac-
counts receivable (AR) + inventories 
(Inv)) - current liabilities (accounts 
payable (AP)): 
The usual procedure to estimate the 
CFE in an indirect way departing 
from the income statement is the 
following:
Where CFE is cash flow to equity; NI 
is net income; NFAt+1 is investment 
in fixed assets ( NFAt+1 = NFAt+1 –
NFAt  = investment in Fixed Assetst+1 
–Depreciation t+1; and represents the 
so-called Net Capital Expenditure);  
WC is change in working capital; 
and D is change in book value of 
debt.
By contrast, a frequent definition in 
textbooks turns out to be:2
With WCnc being noncash (operating) 
working capital:
         (4)
Where LA is liquid assets (C+STI), 
so that ARt+1 +  Invt+1 – APt+1 = 
WCt+1(see, for example, Benninga, 
2006, p. 271, Damodaran, 1999, p. 
128; Damodaran, 2006a, p. 79). In 
eq. (2) change in working capital is 
inclusive of undistributed potential 
dividends LAt+1, whereas in eq. (3) 
(1)
2 Eqs. (1) and (3) may obviously be written as:
nc
(2)
(3)
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change in working capital excludes 
LAt+1. That is the reason why 
the term in parenthesis in eq. (2) 
is greater than the term in paren-
thesis in eq. (3). As a result, CFE 
is smaller than CFE*. The missing 
term ( LA) is the so called poten-
tial dividends. Potential dividends 
overvalue actual cash flows and, 
hence, firm value.3 
In fact, the term potential dividends 
has been coined by Damodaran (2008, 
pp. 205-206) and accepted by other 
authors (Benninga, 2006; Benninga 
and Sarig, 1997; Brealey and Myers, 
2003; Copeland et al.,4 1990; Damo-
daran, 2006a, 2006b). 
Another assumption usually made is 
that investment in liquid assets has 
a NPV equal to zero. For this reason, 
the present value of the cash flows is 
usually added to the book value of 
liquid assets. 
1.2. A literature review
We agree with Vélez-Pareja and 
Magni (2009), on the “idea that 
potential dividends that are not 
distributed (and that are invested 
in liquid assets) should be neglected 
in firm valuation, because only 
distributed cash flows add value 
to shareholders” (p. 125). As these 
authors conclude, “(…) Cash Flow 
to Equity should include only the 
cash flow that is actually paid to 
shareholders” (p. 125). (dividends 
paid plus stock buy backs minus 
new equity investment). This is also 
supported by others (DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo, 2006, 2007; Fernández, 
2002, 2007; Shrieves and Wachowicz 
2001; Tham and Vélez-Pareja, 2004; 
Vélez-Pareja, 1999a, 1999b, 2004, 
2005a, 2005b).
Dechow, Richardson, and Sloan 
(2006) have found that: 
A common approach to corporate 
valuation is to discount the expected 
free cash flows generated by a firm’s 
business operations. An implicit 
assumption with this approach is 
that the use of free cash flows is not 
important (i.e., whether they are 
retained as cash or distributed to 
debtholders or equityholders). Our 
results suggest that this assumption 
does not hold in practice. In particu-
lar, we find that cash retained by 
the firm tends to be less valuable 
because it is more likely to be associ-
ated with future declines in return 
on investment. Our results suggest 
that a superior approach to corpo-
rate valuation is to specifically fore-
cast how much free cash flows will 
be retained by the firm and deduct 
this amount from the measure of free 
cash flows. Equivalently, a more ap-
propriate approach is to directly dis-
count forecasted cash distributions 
to debt and equity holders, after 
explicitly modeling the investment 
of retained cash flows. (p. 5)
In a footnote they say: 
Most definitions of free cash flows add 
back the change in the cash balance. 
This assumes that the cash balance 
can be paid out to financiers and so 
the cash balance is a source of free 
cash flow. Our results suggest that 
increases in the cash balance are ge-
3 From equation (1) to this point it has been taken and adapted from Vélez-Pareja and Magni (2009).
4 Professor Tom Copeland in a private correspondence says (August 6th, 2004): “If funds are kept within 
the firm you still own them -hence ‘potential dividends’ are cash flow available to shareholders, whether 
or not they are paid out now or in the future.”
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nerally not paid out, but instead are 
reinvested in net assets. (p. 5)
Boldfaces are ours. All these authors 
claim that cash flows should include 
only what debt and equity holders 
actually receive. 
As mentioned by Vélez-Pareja and 
Magni (2009), some recognized 
authors such as Copeland et al. 
(1990, 1994, 2000); Benninga and 
Sarig (1997); Benninga (2006), Bre-
aley and Myers (2003); Damodaran 
(1999, 2006a,  2006b) and most prac-
titioners support the idea that the 
Cash Flow to Equity has to include 
undistributed dividends and the 
liquid assets are zero NPV invest-
ments. For instance, see Benninga 
(2006, p. 271), where he excludes 
cash and market securities, and p. 
288, where he adds the book value of 
cash (cash is used as a plug to match 
the balance sheet and it includes 
cash in hand and market securi-
ties). See also Benninga and Sarig 
(1997, p. 36), where they define that 
“cash and marketable securities are 
the best example of working capital 
items that we exclude from our defi-
nition” of working capital. In p. 428-
429 they state that “the value of non 
operating assets should be added to 
the value of the business to obtain an 
estimate of the whole firm”, and “(…) 
non operating assets are effectively 
liquidity reserves that don’t generate 
any positive NPV”, Hence all we have 
to do is “to value such non operating 
assets at their current market price 
[italics in original]”.
Copeland et al. (1994), define operat-
ing working capital and exclude liquid 
assets, they express that “investment 
in short-term marketable securities 
is a zero net present value [italics 
added]” (p. 161) and its value is the 
book value of those assets. Copeland 
et al. (2000) say the same.
Vélez-Pareja and Magni (2009) pres-
ent evidence from the current litera-
ture that dividends paid are valued 
more than potential dividends, and 
that Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow 
agency problem with respect to the 
use managers give to the excess 
cash in a firm, is correct (DeAngelo 
and DeAngelo, 2006); Vélez-Pareja 
and Magni (2009), also state that 
“literature reports that holding 
liquid assets destroys value or at 
most does not create a significant 
amount of value” (p. 125). Schwet-
zler and Carsten (2003), Harford 
(1999), Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and 
Williamson (1999), Faulkender and 
Wang (2004), Mikkelson and Partch 
(2003), Pinkowitz, Williamson and 
Stulz (2007), Pinkowitz, Stulz and 
Williamson (2003), Pinkowitz and 
Williamson (2002), Damodaran 
(2005), accepts the findings of these 
last authors and states that cash 
holdings create less value than 
dividends paid. In general, the idea 
is that one dollar of liquid assets in 
t+1 might have today a value of more 
than one dollar. 
Chu and Partington (2008) report 
repeatedly that, today, one dollar 
in dividends (in the future), is more 
worth than one dollar
Consistent with imputation tax cre-
dits adding value to the dividend, 1 
dollar face value of dividends was 
observed to have a market value sig-
nificantly greater than its face value. 
The market value of the dividend 
varied depending on the proximity of 
observations to the ex-dividend date. 
(pp.10-12).
%345$)/3'%2%.#)!,%3
Most of these authors (excepting 
Harford, 1999) consider that one 
future dollar in dividends (and in 
potential dividends) is worth more 
than or equal to one dollar today. 
This contradicts the elementary 
time value of the money concept: 
one dollar today is worth more than 
a dollar tomorrow. Or, putting it 
the other way around: one dollar 
tomorrow is less worth than one 
dollar today.
We interpret our results in a dif-
ferent way. Given our model, the 
coefficients are discount factors. 
Therefore, if we are considering $1 
tomorrow, we expect that its value 
today be less than $1. In the next sec-
tion we present the model we have 
tested in this work.
Vélez-Pareja and Magni (2009) pres-
ent several arguments against the 
practice of including cash and cash 
holdings in the cash flows: 
Economic arguments underline that 
only flows of cash should be considered 
for valuation; theoretical arguments 
show how potential dividends lead to 
contradiction and to arbitrage losses. 
Empirical arguments, from recent 
studies, suggest that investors dis-
count potential dividends with high 
discount rates, which means that 
changes in liquid assets are not value 
drivers (p. 123).
 In short, there is a contradiction in 
considering cash flows something 
listed in the balance sheet and, at 
the same time, not received by claim-
holders. 
  -%4(/$/,/'9
2.1. The model
As mentioned in Vélez-Pareja and 
Magni (2009), our model is based on 
the financial theory of valuation of cash 
flows. We do not “fish out” variables to 
include in the model. The empirical 
evidence is tested with a theoretically 
correct financial model. The model is 
based on standard results of the corpo-
rate financial theory and, in particular, 
on Modigliani and Miller (1963). We 
use the following equation
                        (5)
where E is the market value of equity, 
Ke is the levered cost of equity, and 
CFE, the cash flow to equity. CFE 
is defined as Div – CS where Div 
is dividends paid and CS is the 
change in capital stock.5 Dividends 
paid are what actually the equity 
holder receives from the firm and 
can put in the own pocket; CS is 
the increase (new equity investment) 
or decrease (repurchase of equity) in 
CS, Capital Stock.
Model (5) is a standard in valuation of 
cash flow (see, for example, Miller and 
Modigliani, 1961, eq. (2)). However, 
we would like to explain in detail the 
reason for Et+1 in the model. What the 
market does to value a stock is to dis-
count the full stream of dividends from 
t+1 to ∞. As we cannot model that fact, 
we can assume that for year t+1 the 
market did exactly the same but from 
5 ∆CS from the point of view of the equity holder, is positive when the firm buybacks equity and negative 
when the equity holder invests additional funds in the firm.
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t+2 to ∞. This is captured in the value 
of the stock (or market capitalization) 
for year t+1. Hence, when we include 
the dividends for year t+1 plus the 
market value at t+1, it is equivalent 
to having the full infinite stream of 
dividends from t+1 to ∞. That is what 
supposedly the market does. This is 
an incontrovertible formulation of the 
basic concept of time value of money 
and it is common knowledge.
From the previous model we have 
designed an econometric model to 
test our hypothesis. The correct 
model is:
Et=1Et+1+2Divt+1+3∆CSt+1+t
What we are doing when using this 
model is to see the value of the firm 
from the point of view of the share 
holders. We have a model that val-
ues the equity, and hence the terms 
in the right hand side (RHS) of (6a), 
including the cash flow to equity, 
CFE and the value of equity in t+1. 
What eq. (6a) indicates is exactly 
the same as eq. (5) does. The dif-
ference is that instead of having 
a common discount rate, Ke, we 
consider that each element of the 
CFE might have a different discount 
rate. The common term (1/(+ke)) a 
discount factor) is broken down into 
three discount factors represented 
by the β’s. 
The definition of CFE in this model is 
clear and concise, and also supported 
by others authors. As Penman (2007) 
underlines, 
Owner’s equity increases from value 
added in business activities (income) 
and decreases if there is a net payout 
to owners. Net payout is amounts paid 
to shareholders less amount received 
from share issues. As cash can be paid 
out in dividends or share repurchases, 
net payout is stock repurchases plus 
dividends minus proceeds from share 
issue [italics in original]. (p.39) 
He also writes that “it is noncontro-
versial that the price of a security 
is expressed as the ‘present value’ 
of the expected future payoffs to 
holding the security” (Penman, 1992, 
p. 466), where “payoffs” unambigu-
ously refers to “the payoffs for equity 
securities” (p. 466). His notions of 
“net cash flow to shareholders” (p. 
239) or “net dividend” (p. 241) are 
consistent with our notion of cash 
flow to equity: 
Net dividend= Cash dividend 
+Share repurchases–Share Issues
In order to test the hypothesis that 
LA, the change in liquid assets, 
is irrelevant or destroys value, we 
falsify the correct model introducing 
the change in liquid assets, LA, as 
follows:
(6a)
(6b)
Et =1Et+1+2Divt+1 + 3∆CSt+1 +
+ 4∆LAt+1 + t
In the two previous equations CS 
corresponds to change in Capital 
Stock (in the data we have changed 
the sign to the change in CS: an in-
crease in CS means extra investment 
from the equity holders and it is an 
outflow; a decrease in CS means a 
buyback of stocks and it is an inflow 
to the share holders), Div is dividends 
paid, LA is undistributed potential 
dividends and equal to the change 
in liquid assets as shown above in 
equations (1) to (4). E means equity 
market value, and LA is liquid assets. 
In this model a proprietary approach 
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is followed, where Et is measured as 
the declared market capitalization.
This model is consistent with the 
standard finance theory, but we do 
not intend to claim that it is fully 
explanatory, nor we try to make use 
of it for forecasting purposes. The 
models are meant to provide infor-
mation on the relevance of the inde-
pendent variables, in particular, the 
relevance/irrelevance of LAt+1 to 
value creation. To this end, the vari-
ous betas are to be interpreted as the 
discount factors for the independent 
variables. In particular, β4 is the 
discount factor for change in liquid 
assets, i.e. it represents the value at 
time t of one dollar of LAt+1 avail-
able at time t+1. 
Coefficients for the variables are in-
terpreted as follows: an increase of $1 
in any variable will be equivalent to 
an increase of $β in value in t. If β >0 
(let us say, 0,80) then we say that one 
increase of $1 in a given variable (in 
t+1 ) it is equivalent to an increase of 
0,80 of the value in t. The coefficient is 
a discount factor that brings back to t 
(present value) that $1 in t+1. This is 
exactly what we teach about the time 
value of money in our courses. On the 
contrary, if β<0 (in particular β4, the 
coefficient for LA in the falsified 
model) it means that it destroys 
value. Hence, if LA decreases 
(negative) and its coefficient is nega-
tive, at the end it would mean that 
it creates value instead of destroy-
ing value. The logic of this lies in 
the fact that if we invest the funds in 
cash in hand or in a very low return 
investment, shareholders will push 
the management to distribute that 
money instead of leaving it, say, in 
the bank. They consider that they can 
invest it at a higher rate. 
What do we expect from coefficients β? 
We expect β1 and β2 to be positive and 
less than 1. We expect β4 to be zero or 
negative. We expect β3 to be negative or 
positive. This last comment deserves 
an explanation: as CS is depicted 
as a cash flow, when it has a negative 
value it means that the shareholders 
have increased their investment in 
the firm. When it is positive it means 
that the firm has bought some equity 
back and it is an inflow for the equity 
holders. If β3 is negative, it indicates 
that the market is recognizing a value 
driver in the extra equity investment: 
this means that -$1 of equity invest-
ment in t+1 is equivalent to-β3 today, 
and this is a positive value (–β3 × 
-$1). At the same time it would imply 
that the market sees the repurchase 
of equity as a negative value driver, 
even if it represents an inflow to the 
equity holder. On the contrary, if β3 
is positive, it would mean that the 
market values equity repurchases as 
a value driver, and is not aware that 
a new equity investment might be a 
value driver. 
In order to normalize the data and 
avoid problems of size, currency, time, 
etc., we will divide each variable by 
the book value of total equity (BVE) 
in t. We also deflate items in year 
t+1 with the corresponding inflation 
rate. As all variables will be divided 
by book value of total assets, the ra-
tio E/BVE will represent Tobin’s Q. 
These independent variables are the 
normalized proxies for components 
of equation (5). 
Equations (6a) and (6b), the correct 
model, will be affected by BVE and 
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deflated by (1+πt+1) where π is infla-
tion rate as follows:
The falsified correct model is modified 
as follows:
peat, we do not fish out variables. The 
variables are those stipulated by the 
correct model. In the falsified model 
we introduce a new (“strange” to the 
model) variable as they do in practice 
and recommend according to the lit-
erature review. And our hypothesis 
is that this new variable should be 
non-statistically significant.
2.2. The hypotheses
Our hypothesis may be phrased in a 
strong or in a soft version (similar to 
Vélez-Pareja and Magni, 2009):
“Strong version: we expect β6 [or β4 in 
this article] to be statistically zero (or 
close to zero). This means that inves-
tors will try to set down the value of 
Divpot(t+1)[or LAt+1 in this article] by 
discounting it with an infinite, or at 
least at a very high discount rate, 
because they do not consider (undis-
tributed) potential dividends relevant 
for valuation. Another condition 
might be that β6 [or β4 in this article] 
be negative and this would mean that 
potential dividends destroy value.
Soft version: we expect Divpot(t+1)[or 
LAt+1 in this article] to be evalu-
ated much less than the actual 
dividends. In econometric terms, we 
expect β6 [or β4 in this article] to be 
much smaller than β5 [or β3 in this 
article]” (pp. 145-146). A negative β4 
is included in the soft version of our 
hypotheses and this would mean 
that potential dividends destroy 
value. In terms of NPV, it means 
that investment in liquid assets 
does not have a zero NPV.
  $%3#2)04)/. /& $!4!
The source of data was primarily 
Economatica, and in case of abnor-
(7a)
Et
BVEt
= β1
Et+1
BVEt× 1+πt+1
+ β2
Divt+1
BVEt× 1+πt+1
+
+β3
CSt+1
BVEt× 1+πt+1
+
(7b)+ β4 LA t+1BVEt× 1+πt+1 + εt+1
where all variables are now meant to 
be divided by book value of equity, the 
independent variables are also deflat-
ed. The deflation is made with t+1, the 
inflation rate for year t+1. With this 
model, the value of the firm depends 
on the cash flows the owners of equity 
expect to receive in the future, and on 
potential dividends as well. 
The components of model (7a) and (7b) 
depict the shareholders’ prospect of 
future value and cash flows to equity. 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q, 
whereas the independent variables 
will be a percent of the book value of 
equity in t. With this model we try to 
measure how much value is created 
for a given value of the independent 
variables in the following period. 
It should be here noticed that the mod-
els do not include an intercept. The 
reason is that we start from a correct 
financial and theoretical model. When 
we use an intercept it is because we 
fish out variables until we have come 
to a proper model. In this case, we re-
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mal behavior of the data we double 
checked with other sources. Second-
ary sources for checking purposes and 
completion of missing data were: 
1. Google Finance: http://finance.
google.com/finance
2. Argentina: Comisión Nacional 
de Valores, CNV (National Ex-
change Commision): http://www.
cnv.gov.ar/
3. Brasil: BOVESPA (São Paulo Stock 
Exchange): http://www.bmfbovespa.
com.br/home.aspx?idioma=pt-br 
4. México: Bolsa Mexicana de Va-
lores (Mexican Stock Exchange): 
http://www.bmv.com.mx/ 
5. Chile: Bolsa de Comercio de 
Santiago de Chile (Chilean Stock 
Exchange): http://www.bolsades-
antiago.com/ 
6. Peru: Bolsa de Valores de Lima 
(Peruvian Stock Exchange): http://
www.bvl.com.pe/ 
Initially we intended to collect data 
from seven countries, but the infor-
mation for Colombia and Venezuela 
lacked of a very relevant variable: the 
actual dividends paid per year listed 
in the cash flow statement. In the 
case of Brazil we found in Economa-
tica the dividends paid data for only 
three years. We completed for three 
more years using data from Reuters, 
Bloomberg and Google Finance.
Hence, we collected the data for 
five Latin American countries from 
1991 to 2007. The countries with 
consistent and reliable data were: 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and 
Peru. In particular we required that 
the data were directly available. The 
status of the information by country 
is like in Table 1.
For the implementation of the test, 
we collected information which is 
usually publicly available:
1. Market capitalization as declared 
by the firm with no adjustment for 
splits
2. CS = (Cumulated) capital stock 
contributed by shareholders
3. Div = Dividends paid in cash 
4. C = Cash
#OUNTRY "ALANCE SHEET  )NCOME  STATEMENT
#ASH &LOW  
3TATEMENT -ARKET RATIOS
!RGENTINA !RG	    
"RAZIL "RA	   
 
-EXICO -EX	    
#HILE #HI	    
0ERU 0ER	    
6ENEZUELA

 6EN	   .! 
#OLOMBIA

 #OL	   .! 
/>LiÊ£°Ê->«iÊ«iÀ`ÃÊvÀÊÌiÊViVÌi`Ê`>Ì>
* Economatica has only data for the years 2005-2007. The rest was obtained, mainly, from Google 
Finance
**  None of the sources available gives information of the Cash Flow Statement
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5. STI = Short-term investments 
(marketable securities)
6. BVE = Book value of equity
With these data we calculated ∆CS, 
the change in capital stock and ∆LA 
the change in liquid assets (C+STI).
We had to fix some criteria to define 
how we would extract the data from 
the database, as follows:
1. Closing date: we found diverse 
dates for the fiscal year of the 
financial statements. However, 
all data were collected on Decem-
ber 31st. We have assumed that 
at this date there would be no 
signaling effect from dividends 
announcements. 
2. The use of consolidated or not 
consolidated financial state-
ments: we decided to use consoli-
dated financial statements. 
3. Currency and inflation adjust-
ments: we extracted the financial 
statements in the local currency 
and without adjustments for in-
flation. The model provided “nor-
malization” of the data dividing by 
BVE and deflating future values 
(in t+1) to the present period, t. 
4. Dividends paid in cash: we de-
cided to include in the sample only 
those firms (and countries) that 
reported the dividends effectively 
paid in cash in the cash flow state-
ment. This was the reason why 
Colombia and Venezuela were 
excluded from the sample. 
In our analysis we only included non 
financial firms and stocks with a high 
market liquidity index. The financial 
industry (banks, insurance firms, and 
pension funds) was excluded because 
we do not have dividends paid from 
the cash flow statement. Additionally, 
there is not a clear cut distinction 
between cash in hand and cash as an 
inventory to operate. The concept of 
liquid assets in the financial firms is 
somewhat different from the non finan-
cial firms. In the financial firms cash 
plays a different role as in non financial 
firms. We could even say (although it 
is not part of the study) that, by defini-
tion, financial firms do not hold liquid 
assets (CDs, pension funds invest-
ments, etc.). Cash in the financial firms 
plays the role of inventory.
We cleaned up the data and eliminat-
ed all those cases that did not have 
information for some of the variables. 
We distinguish between no data and 
zero as value of the variable. The 
result of this cleaning up was that 
the final sample was seriously unbal-
anced. See Appendix A for a complete 
description of the data collected.
A statistical description of the col-
lected variables follows including the 
deflation of terms in t+1 for the total 
sample is in Table 2. Composition 
 Et / BVEt Vt+1 / BVEt Divt+1 / BVEt ∆CSt+1 / BVEt ∆LAt+1 / BVEt
-EAN     
3TANDARD $EVIATION     
-INIMUM     
-AXIMUM     
.UMBERS OF /BSERVATIONS     
/>LiÊÓ°ÊiÃVÀ«ÌÛiÊÃÌ>ÌÃÌVÃÊvÀÊÌiÊ`>Ì>ÊViVÌi`
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of the data by country, number of 
firms and observations is displayed 
in Table 3. 
  2%35,43
In this section we show the different 
regression analyses performed with 
the data collected. 
We have run several tests to measure 
the consistency and robustness of 
the data:
1. Homoscedasticity: we applied a 
test for robustness and it elimi-
nated some variables from the 
model
2. Autocorrelation (passed) 
3. Data panel that eliminated the 
same variables as in 1
The sequence of tests applied to the 
data is shown in Appendix B. The 
results for the models after the test 
for robustness follow. Table 4 shows 
the statistics for the falsified model. 
Notice we are including the potential 
dividends, as Damodaran calls them. 
As can be seen in Appendix B, first we 
tested a model including the constant 
or intercept. It also can be noticed 
here, that the constant is not signifi-
cant. The final results after applying 
the robustness test are in Table 4.
/>LiÊ{°Ê
ÀÀiVÌÊ >`Ê v>Ãwi`Ê`iÊ
ÜÌÕÌÊÌiÀVi«ÌÊ­ÀLÕÃÌiÃÃÊÌiÃÌ®
Dep. Var. EtBVEt 4HEORETICAL &ALSIlED
 
Et+1/BVEt
p-value  
∆LAt+1 / BVEt   
p-value   
2  
 OF /BSERVATIONS  
/>LiÊÎ°Ê ÕLiÀÊvÊwÀÃ]ÊLÃiÀÛ>ÌÃÊ>`Ê>ÛiÀ>}iÊ«iÀÊwÀ
#OUNTRY .UMBER OF lRMS .UMBER OF  OBSERVATIONS
!VERAGE OBSERVATION  
PER lRM
!RGENTINA   
"RAZIL   
#HILE   
-EXICO   
0ERU   
4OTAL   
As we can see, β4, the coefficient 
for ΔLAt+1/BVEt, is significant and 
has negative sign. This behavior of 
ΔLAt+1/BVEt, is identical in all re-
gressions (with robust adjustment) 
excluding (one by one) the extreme 
values for Et/BVEt, that are greater 
than its mean plus three standard 
deviations. This is what was expected 
to happen and we can see the trend 
in Exhibit A4, in Appendix A.
We ran data panel tests for the cor-
rect and falsified models with and 
without intercept. The test for the 
two models with random effects, 
maximum likelihood effects (MLE) 
and without intercept, is displayed 
in the Table 5.
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We can observe once again that 
Et+1/BVE and ΔLAt+1/BVEt are sig-
nificant at 5%.
In summary, we show the results with 
OLS with the robustness test and 
Data Panel with MLE in Table 6.
dependent variable plus 3-sigma 
and in all the tests ∆LA is consis-
tently statistically significant and 
negative. Our sample included all 
the valid values; we did not delete 
any outlier. Our conclusion is that 
funds kept in cash and/or in short 
term investments destroy value as 
expected. This compares with some 
current literature mentioned in sec-
tion one that assigns a positive value 
today or even greater than 1 to one 
dollar of liquid assets in next year. 
As it can be noticed we can say that 
the market is averse to the ∆LA as a 
value driver because β4 is negative. 
The behavior of the coefficient for 
∆LA deserves more explanation. In 
the strong version of our hypothesis 
we consider that ∆LA should not 
make any difference in value because 
∆LA IS NOT a cash flow. Not being 
a cash flow should not appear in the 
model, hence its coefficient should 
be zero. When we falsify the model 
and insert that variable in it, we are 
testing the consequences of having 
some extra cash (or quasi cash) tied 
in the bank account or in short term 
investments. The data show that 
precisely the amount of funds tied to 
those items in the balance sheet are 
Dep. Var. 
Et+1 / BVEt
4HEORETICAL -ODEL &ALSIlED -ODEL
Et+1 / BVEt  
p-Value  
∆LAt+1 / BVEt   
p-Value  
 
3T %RROR  
Wald X2  
Prob >X2   
.UMBERS OF /BSERVATIONS  
/>LiÊx°Ê,>`vviVÌÃÊ-ÊÀi}ÀiÃÃÊ­®ÊÊVÀÀiVÌÊ
>`Êv>Ãwi`Ê`iÃ
Dep. Var. 
Et+1 / BVEt
4HEORETICAL &ALSIlED
2OBUST /,3
Et+1 / BVEt  
p-Value  
∆LAt+1 / BVEt   
p-Value   
  $ATA 0ANEL  
Et+1 / BVEt  
p-Value  
∆LAt+1 / BVEt   
p-Value   
Prob >X2  
 OF /BSERVATIONS  
Table 6. Summary of OLS and data 
panel tests
We can observe that ∆LA is statisti-
cally significant and its coefficient is 
negative. We must say that we have 
tested the model with the data that 
included the highest fifteen values 
(one by one) above the mean of the 
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correlated to a lower (or loss of) value. 
This is what a negative coefficient for 
∆LA means. 
In tests using OLS and robust esti-
mates with data within ±14 standard 
deviations dividends are statistically 
significant but the value of the coef-
ficient is greater than 1, which is 
contrary to the financial theory of time 
value of money, although this result is 
consistent with the reported findings 
mentioned in the literature review. 
Moreover, we see that ∆LA destroys 
value, since each dollar in ∆LA in t+1 
destroys -$1,13 of value today. The 
rejection of Div and ∆CS might be 
interpreted as if the market did not 
value dividends and that the market 
did not fully measure the impact of 
that extra investment in the value of 
the stock. What market values most 
is the expected value of E. One pos-
sible explanation is shown in Table 2 
where, on average for the dividends 
(0,06 on the average) and ∆CS (-0,05 
on the average) are so low compared 
with equity (1,90 on the average) that 
seems that the market does not value 
dividends as value drivers. In Table 7 
we can observe the return on equity 
market value. In other words, our 
strong version hypothesis is rejected 
and this means that the Net Present 
Value of the investment in liquid 
assets is not zero, contrary to what 
generalized knowledge says.
Now we analyze selected ranges for 
the discount factor, DF, and out of 
this point we can infer selected ranges 
for the implicit discount rate, DR. We 
constructed the Table 8 of Aversion / 
Not aversion by the market and values 
of the discount rate and factor.
 Divt+1 / Et Et+1 / Et-1
-EAN RETURN  
3TANDARD $EVIATION  
-AXIMUM  
-INIMUM  
/>LiÊÇ°Êi>Ê>Õ>ÊÀiÌÕÀÊ­Ài>®ÊvÀÊ
`Û`i`ÃÊ>`ÊiµÕÌÞÊÛ>Õi
$ISCOUNT  
&ACTOR
$ISCOUNT  
2ATE $2 -ARKET
DF or Beta  !VERSION.OT !VERSION
1<DF<∞ 0>DR>-1 !VERSION
0,5<DF<1 1>DR>0 .OT AVERSION
0<DF<0,5 +∞>DR>1 !VERSION
Near 0+ +∞ !VERSION
Near 0- -∞ !VERSION
-0,5<DF<0
-3>DR>-
∞ !VERSION
-∞<DF<0,5 -1>DR>-3 !VERSION
/>LiÊn°Ê,>}iÊvÊ`ÃVÕÌÊv>VÌÀÊ­β®Ê
>`Ê«i`ÊÀiÌÕÀ
The meaning of the coefficients, as 
we have said before, is a discount 
factor that implies a discount rate. 
In Table 9a we show the discount 
factor for the correct model for the 
independent variables and for ∆LA 
from the falsified model. 
/>LiÊ>°Ê6>ÕiÊvÊiÊ` >ÀÊÌ`>ÞÊvÀÊ
ÌiÊv>Ãwi`Ê`iÊ­vÀÊ`>Ì>Ê«>i®
 IN T  
OF 6ALUE 4ODAY #ORRECT &ALSIlED
Et+1 / BVEt  
∆LAt+1 / BVEt   
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In terms of discount rates for each of 
the components of the CFE we can 
say that the implicit cost of equity 
for each component is:
                                      (8)
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Implicit discount rates are shown in 
Table 9b. 
/>LiÊL°Ê«VÌÊ`ÃVÕÌÊÀ>ÌiÊvÀÊ
Et+1 / BVEt
  $ISCOUNT &ACTOR  
"ETA	
$ISCOUNT 2ATE
Et+1 / BVEt  
In the same fashion, β4, the coefficient 
of ∆LAt+1/BVEt implies a discount 
rate of −188,55%. This is an expected 
result and it might be interpreted as 
an aversion from the market to the 
potential dividends.
We examined the consistency of the 
coefficients and observed values for 
the theoretically correct model. We 
assume that the equity value can 
be calculated either considering 
each element of equation (1) has 
a discount rate, or that the sum 
of them (Et+1 + CFEt+1) has a single 
discount rate (Ke). The weighted 
average of betas (discount factor) is 
A, as follows:
(9a)
Equation (9a) means that in the model 
we assign a beta (a discount factor) to 
each component of equation (6a) in the 
RHS. In the left hand side (LHS), we 
consider the three elements of equa-
tion (6a) as a whole and discount it 
with an average discount factor, A. 
The weighted average of betas should 
be the average discount factor for Ke. 
In this case we accept it is a proper 
discount factor if: 
  β1×Et+1+β2×Divt+1+β3×CSt+1
Et+1+Divt+1+CSt+1
 (9b)
And restricted to 0<A<1, where A is 
the average discount factor for the 
correct model. An analysis of the val-
ues for A gives the following results 
(Table 10).
/>LiÊ £ä°ÊÛiÀ>}iÊvÊAÊ >`Ê «VÌÊ
`ÃVÕÌÊÀ>ÌiÊ­>ÃÃÕ}Êβ½ÃÊvÀÊ`>Ì>Ê
«>i®
!
-EAN 
-EAN IMPLICIT RETURN FOR EQUITY 
This mean implicit Ke compares with 
the implicit Ke in the coefficient of 17% 
and with the mean return of 24%.
What is the behavior of the change 
in Capital Stock and Liquid Assets? 
This is relevant because it gives us 
an idea of the sign of the cash flow. 
A negative sign in ∆CS means that 
shareholders increased their invested 
capital. A negative sign in ∆LA means 
that the firm recovered investment 
in market securities and cash to 
use it in alternative investments or 
distributed it to the claim holders. 
In Table 11a we show the number of 
cases in the sample that have nega-
tive observations. 
/>LiÊ££>°Ê-}ÊvÊ∆CS >`Ê∆LA
∆CS ∆LA
.UMBER OF NEGATIVE  
OBSERVATIONS  
2ELATIVE FREQUENCY  
The sum of the ∆CS and ∆LA gives 
an idea of the relevance of the data 
(negative or positive) in the results. 
This is shown in Table 11b.
/>LiÊ££L°Ê-ÕÊvÊ∆CS >`Ê∆LA
 ∆CS ∆LA
3UM OF NEGATIVE  
OBSERVATIONS  
2ELATIVE FREQUENCY  
A× Et+1+Divt+1+CSt+1 =β
β1×Et+1+β2×Divt+1+β3×CSt+1
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When we observe the results in the 
previous tables we conclude that al-
most 77% of the observations show an 
increase in capital stock. And not only 
this, the absolute amount is much 
larger that the buybacks (237,07 vs. 
58,66). The fact that the change in 
capital stock has been rejected from 
the model could be interpreted as if 
the market does not recognize that 
the increase in capital stock repre-
sents an opportunity to increase the 
value of the firm.
On the other hand, we can see that 
the decrease in liquid assets is much 
lower, almost 44%. In this case, the 
absolute value of decreases compared 
with the increased is much lower: 
(102,62 vs. 200,12). The fact that 
change in liquid assets is rejected 
from the model might be interpreted 
as if the market perceives an increase 
of liquid assets as a value destroyer.
As a summary:
1. We have chosen a model that is 
robust and that has been long 
time ago supported by current 
literature and practice. It is based 
on the findings of Modigliani and 
Miller (1958, 1963). The model 
is common to all present value 
analysis. We have tested a well 
proven and utilized model in the 
current financial valuation prac-
tice.
2. The model is statistically signi-
ficant and has an R2 of at least 
0,92.
3. We have analyzed a database that 
is significant: 3.482 observations.
4. Given the linear structure of the 
model, we consider that OLS is 
an appropriate estimation tool 
for the model. We tested the re-
gression results with additional 
tests such as autocorrelation6 and 
homoscedasticity. As a final test 
we applied data panel to test the 
data.
5. Given that the model is theoreti-
cally correct, we have not added 
any additional independent vari-
able. The model has only the 
variables included in the correct 
version. We have falsified the cor-
rect model with an independent 
variable that is used precisely for 
testing its relevance. We tested 
the intercept and it proved to be 
non significant. 
6. Our prior expectation before gath-
ering and analyzing the available 
data is partially confirmed with the 
analysis. The model was proposed 
in Vélez-Pareja and Magni (2009). 
  #/.#,5$).' 2%-!2+3
We have found the empirical evidence 
that liquid assets destroy value. This 
confirms Jensen’s (1986) free cash 
flow agency problem. We also found 
that the investment in liquid assets 
is not perceived by the market as a 
zero NPV investment. 
On the other hand, we found that 
the market discounts the CFE with 
discount rates below 100%. Contrary 
to what is found in some literature, 
one dollar in the future is worth less 
than one dollar today as expected 
6 Some tests cannot be applied, such as the Granger Test because we need a time series and our data 
have under the best of circumstances a sequence of 11 observations and it can be applied only to pairs of 
variables. See Appendix A, Table A4.
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according to the time value of money 
concept.
In summary, we can draw several 
conclusions:
1. This exploration is a confirmation 
of the Jensen’s (1986) free cash 
flow agency costs problem. Excess 
cash should be distributed because 
its retention destroys value.
2. Investment in liquid assets does 
not have a zero NPV. It has a 
negative NPV.
3. Market values more the expected 
price of the share than dividends. 
In fact, the independent variable 
Dividends (Div) is rejected from 
the regression. 
4. Analysts should not include 
change in Liquid Assets (LA) as 
cash flow, because it is a fiction 
that contradicts the empirical 
evidence of reality.
5. There is an overvaluation of cash 
flows when the analysts include in 
the value the actual book value of 
liquid assets when it is assumed 
that liquid assets are zero NPV 
investments. While the change in 
liquid assets is discounted at the 
cost of capital when included in 
the FCF, that change, with con-
trary sign is discounted at usually 
a lower rate when considered as 
part of the cash flow of the liquid 
assets investment. 
6. If analysts include ∆LA in the 
cash flow, this is to say that ∆LA 
is fully distributed, it should be 
consistency between the financial 
statements and the cash flows. In 
other words, the equity book value 
should show the fact that there is 
either a new equity investment, or 
a repurchase of equity.
The fact that idle cash or cash invest-
ed in low return investments destroys 
value is not solved by including those 
amounts that are listed in the balance 
sheet in the cash flows as if they were 
distributed to shareholders. The so-
lution is to effectively distribute the 
funds to them. 
As a practical and general conclu-
sion, the empirical evidence sug-
gests that we should include in the 
working capital the liquid assets, 
as well as eliminate the practice of 
adding the book value of liquid as-
sets under the assumption that they 
are zero NPV investments. The only 
relevant cash flow is what effectively 
an investor receives from the equity 
investment: dividends and stock 
repurchases.
Our conclusions are in line with the 
thinking of DeAngelo and DeAngelo 
(2006, 2007), who have devoted much 
of their researches mainly explain-
ing that only distributed cash flows 
produce value.
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* As each observation contains data for the next year, we cannot record an observation for 2007.
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The inflation rate by country in the relevant years is as in Table A2.
/>LiÊÓ°Êy>ÌÊÀ>ÌiÃÊLÞÊVÕÌÀÞ
 9EAR #OUNTRY  !RGENTINA   #HILE   0ERU   -EXICO   "RAZIL 
        
        
       
      
      
      
      
      
      
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
Sources:
http://www4.bcb.gov.br/ visited on June 23, 2008; http://www.banxico.org.mx/ 
visited on June 23, 2008; http://www.indec.mecon.gov.ar/ visited on June 23, 
2008; http://www.ine.cl/canales/chile_estadistico/home.php visited on June 23, 
2008; http://www.inei.gob.pe/ visited on June 23, 2008
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Descriptive statistics for the sample are found in Table A3.
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Dispersion Diagram for Et+1 / BVEt and Et / BVEt 
%8()")4 !
 Dispersion Diagram for Divt+1 BVEt and Et / BVEt 
In the next exhibits we depict the dependent and independent 
variables
y = 0,9687x - 0,145
R2 = 0,9203
y = 2,2353 x + 1,7594
R2 = 0,0018
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Dispersion Diagram for ΔCSt+1 and Et / BVEt 
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Dispersion Diagram for ΔLAt+1 and Et / BVEt
y = 0,22866 x + 1,9052
R2 = 0,0001
y = -0,2866x + 1,9052
R2 = 0,000
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Dispersion Diagram for ΔLAt+1 and Divt+1 BVEt 
%8()")4 ! 
Histogram for ΔLAt+1/BVEt 
y = 0,0393 x + 0,0542
R2 = 0,0063
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Distribution of observations by country, year and firm
We analyzed the observations by year, country and firms and found 
that the number of firms by country with an uninterrupted sequence 
of observations, and with a minimum of 4 in a row, is more than 50% 
of the sample.
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Table B1 shows the statistics for the theoretical (correct) and the falsi-
fied models. Observe that we are including the potential dividends, as 
Damodaran calls them. First, we tested a model with constant included. 
As can be noticed, the constant is not significant. 
$EP 6AR Et / BVEt  4HEORETICAL   &ALSIlED 
)NTERCEPT  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p-Value  
Et+1 / BVEt 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p-Value  
Divt+1 / BVEt  
p-Value  
∆CSt+1 /BVEt  
p-Value  
∆LAt+1 /BVEt   
p-Value   
R2  
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As we are using a theoretically correct model, we consider it is complete 
and therefore an intercept should not be included. In Table B2 we show 
the OLS test without intercept.
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p-Value 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Divt+1 / BVEt 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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 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∆CSt+1 /BVEt 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
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∆LAt+1 /BVEt   
p-Value   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R2  
 OF /BSERVATIONS  
After applying tests for homoscedasticity we applied tests of robust-
ness (Table B3).
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Intercept 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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p-Value 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
p-Value 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
Divt+1 / BVEt 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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∆LAt+1 /BVEt   
p-Value   
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Intercept, Div/BE and ∆CS/BVE are rejected as non significant. After 
this test we ran the robust test again without an intercept. The results 
follow in Table B4.
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Et+1 / BVEt  
p-Value 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Divt+1 / BVEt  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 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∆CSt+1 /BVEt  
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 
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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The previous tests show that the approach in order to model the theo-
retical model without intercept is correct. However, as seen before, 
two independent variables were rejected. Observe that ∆LA/BVE is 
significant and negative, which means it destroys value.
We ran the two models with the significant variables with and without 
intercept and with the robust test (Table B5).
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Intercept  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p-Value 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
Et+1 / BVEt  
p-Value  
∆LAt+1 /BVEt   
p-Value   
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Again, intercept is rejected as non significant and coefficient for ∆LA/
BVE indicates value destruction. 
Now the regression without intercept is as in Table B6.
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Et+1 / BVEt  
p-Value  
∆LAt+1 /BVEt   
p-Value  
 
St. Error  
Wald X 
2  
Prob >X 
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Observe that again the β’s for Div/BE and ∆CSt+1/BVEt and the inter-
cept are not statistically significant. 
Now we test the two models with random effects, maximum likelihood 
effects (MLE) and without intercept (Table B8).
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